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In his memoirs Morrow did not exaggerate when describing the challenges of living in a community where blacks were largely relegated to subordinate social and economic status. Blacks in Hackensack were taken for granted as part of the landscape of cooks, janitors, gardeners, chauffeurs and laborers, the latter often finding work in the paper mills in nearby Bogota. The idea that a black person might seek the same professional opportunities as whites would was, with few exceptions, usually dismissed when not openly discouraged. Morrow encountered this disconcerting reality early on when at his father's instigation he went to check out books at the local public library. The librarian, who resented Hackensack blacks' use of the facility, treated them "with utter contempt and discourtesy," Morrow later recalled. "Her favorite trick with us was to discourage taking home the legal number of books (three) to read. She suggested that the books were too complex or scientific for our understandingor they had just been reserved for someone else." That did not stop the Morrow children from borrowing books. When Morrow refers to a distinct "color line" in Hackensack during his growing up years, he was speaking the simple truth. Social segregation was a way of life, with blacks denied opportunities even to use the local YMCA. Culturally speaking, Hackensack blacks were a "starved populace," lacking opportunities for any significant "cultural development or expression." 14 Always sensitive to the possibility that he was hired as a token rather than an adviser with a meaningful role to play, Morrow insisted that his responsibilities had to be broadened beyond outreach to black voters. Hence his formal title was as "Adviser and Consultant" to the candidate.
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He knew and accepted this core mission and embraced it with gusto, taking special satisfaction in riding in motorcades through cities across the USA in close proximity to the presidential candidate and being noticed by the local media. House mess and accompanied him to lunch for a "full week so others would understand, from the top," that Morrow was part of the team. Morrow's self-imposed social isolation from Washington's black community was a longstanding defense mechanism. In his affecting memoir of growing up in Hackensack, Morrow recalled his lack of affinity for the majority of his black peers, who viewed him as foolish or "uppity" for modeling "white" ways in dress and demeanor and his focus on his studies. most of his life live as an outside man, a status on which he often brooded but which he felt powerless to break through. Ultimately Morrow was willing to pay the price of social isolation because he wanted to make a difference in the world. Working in the Eisenhower White House was a means to that end.
As he had done in accepting a position on the Eisenhower campaign train, Morrow felt obliged to make it clear to both Eisenhower and Sherman Adams that he did not want to be singled out as a token, or even as the administration's "race man." "I told the president," he later recalled,"
[that] it was anathema to me to be an expert on myself." His responsibilities ranged widely, from allotting parking spaces to members of special commissions to security and disposal of "waste" documents. Positioned in a handsome, high- would "just treat all Americans in the same manner." But that was not the situation in the United
States in the 1950s, and Morrow found himself "inevitably" drawn into minority affairs.
Over time Rabb passed on to Morrow the increasingly voluminous correspondence from African Americans on racial issues, starting with demands that the administration take a more proactive role in prosecuting the murderers of Chicago teenager Emmett Till, who had been kidnapped, savagely beaten, and then shot to death while visiting relatives in Mississippi in 1955.
However, when Morrow suggested in wake of the Till case that President Eisenhower convene a conference of clergy, white and black, to discuss the moral implications of the case, Rabb gave him "a tongue lashing" on "the Negro's attitude toward securing his civil rights," which Rabb said was "too aggressive" and too "ungrateful" to the administration for all it had already done for African Americans. Rabb said he was speaking not just for himself but for "most" of the "responsible officials" in the White House who were "completely disgusted" with the black community. 34 All Morrow could do was back off.
Shortly thereafter, the attempt by a young African-American woman, Autherine Lucy, to matriculate at the University of Alabama provoked a major firestorm. frequently found himself in an awkward situation in dealings with black leaders who felt this was not enough, and who wanted more action, more quickly, on the civil rights front.
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From the early days of Eisenhower's presidency black leaders had been seeking face time with him on a range of issues. 44 Morrow believed they had a good case to make. He was convinced that a meeting with "responsible" black leaders would send a signal about the administration's seriousness about minority rights, and he was convinced it would pay off politically as well.
Morrow was acutely aware of the way segregationist Democrats, primarily from the South and border states, were fighting tenaciously to sustain their system of white supremacy against federal intervention. Putting the president on the side of the civil rights cause was the goal. A meeting where Eisenhower could hear directly the concerns of black leaders was a means to that end. 45 As previously noted Morrow's memos had to pass through Eisenhower's designated aide for minority affairs, Max Rabb, but Rabb declined to forward them to the president on the grounds that the president had more important concerns. Rabb assured black leaders that their message was "getting through" to the president. In fact, their message was not getting through. Morrow expressed his "extreme dismay" that blacks felt bitterness after five and a half years of effort and accomplishment. Perhaps more action on the administration's part, the president said, would yield only more bitterness. Granger assured the president that the bitterness alluded to was directed at the segregationists, not at the administration. Eisenhower then relaxed and the conversation continued about twenty minutes beyond the scheduled half hour. At its close Eisenhower reaffirmed the Administration's support for stronger voting rights legislation. The black leaders were then invited to offer their comments to the press in the Fish Room of the White House. "unqualified" successthe black leaders had a different take. Based on his experience listening to the president Granger told Urban League colleagues that Eisenhower was "not nearly as well informed on the day-to-day developments that were our concern as either of his two predecessors." deeply committed to black civil rights. "I think he believes it would be a fine thing to have an integrated society, but I think he probably feels that the more you push it, the more tension it will create so you just wait 50 or 100 years and it will work itself out," King told Wallace. 57 In retrospect, King's analysis seems acute. Eisenhower always viewed himself as a moderate on race issues, fending off extreme civil rights activists on one side and thuggish white supremacists on the other as he sought what he viewed as a sensible middle way. 
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The same week that Morrow joined his colleague Rocco Siciliano at that meeting, White
House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams was grilled by House investigators about gifts he had been taking from a sleazy New England businessman, Bernard Goldfine. Adams insisted that he had never done anything to advance Goldfine's interests in return, but the trail of evidence of Adams' phone calls made to regulatory agencies at Goldfine's behest was damning enough on its face to spark calls for Adams' resignation. The crusty New Englander tried as best he could to ride out the storm, but the so-called Goldfine scandal took its toll on the Republican Party's popularity and by September, Adams was forced to resign. Randolph and other black leaders on behalf of a march on Washington by young people, in order to highlight the "undemocratic resistance to integrated schools" and to "arouse the conscience of America." 68 The idea behind the plan was to march a thousand black and white students down
Pennsylvania Avenue and present a petition to Congress urging more aggressive action on school integration. The spearhead of this initiative, Randolph, sought an audience with the president for a select group of the student marchers as a means of highlighting the issue of school integration.
"The children's march in Washington," he explained to a reporter, "was conceived as a method of giving dramatization to the whole civil rights struggle." another march would be organized for April 18. He noted that in the autumn "certain misunderstandings" resulted in disappointment at not having the opportunity to communicate directly with the president. He added that the young people were "deeply grieved" at not being 70 excluded, and abused. During his time as a field organizer for the NAACP, he had experienced the raw fear of being chased by members of the KKK. He wanted the presidenthis presidentto deliver more ringing calls for equality and to take more dramatic measures through executive orders. But these actions and orders did not occur. It added up, in Morrow's view, to a "lukewarm" approach to black civil rights. 82 Eisenhower's failure to "seize leadership in this vital moment,"
Morrow recalled later, was "sheer trauma for me." 83 At the same time Morrow knew he had an obligation to defend the man who had made him an example of black progress in America. It was not an easy position, and someone as sensitive as Morrow felt every cut even more profoundly than another person in his shoes might have done.
Because of his loyalty to his bossand desire to keep his jobhe consistently defended
Eisenhower's stewardship, citing points of light rather than the battles not fought, noting in particular the effective desegregation of the nation's capital during the Eisenhower presidency. In later years Morrow referred to the 34 th president in terms of his laudable human qualities. As a human being he was "A+ and Summa Cum Laude," Morrow told a black history seminar in New Jersey in later years. But he never backed off his belief that Eisenhower had missed too many chances to do more for a righteous cause. 84 As the clock ticked down on the Eisenhower Administration, Morrow had to consider his self-interest. He did not intend to resign, but he proved willing to take a leave of absence to work caught between militants in the black community who believed that the times were changing too slowly, and political conservatives satisfied with the racial status quo. The 1950s was not an era when dramatic statements were likely to upend long-standing racial prejudices. It was not a time when substantial integration of African Americans into suburban communities and the higher echelons of the professions was possible. But it was an era of beginnings in a much-delayed assault 87 On Washington, who also sought to build connections to the black community through his work for the Republican National Committee, see Michael Mayer, "Valores James Washington," in Mayer, ed., Presidential Profiles: The Eisenhower Years (New York: Facts on File, 2010), 808-809.
